Judicial Checks and Balances
Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (),
Cristian Pop-Eleches and
Andrei Shleifer
Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics
Abstract:
In the Anglo†American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new database of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common†law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo†American system of government for freedom.
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (260)
Published in Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-
Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3451311/Shleifer_JudicialChecks.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not found (http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3451311/Shleifer_JudicialChecks.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3451311/Shleifer_JudicialChecks.pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Judicial Checks and Balances (2004) 
Working Paper: Judicial Checks and Balances (2003) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3451311
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().