Judicial Checks and Balances

Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez- de-Silane, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Rafael La Porta

No 9775, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.

JEL-codes: K4 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-law
Note: EFG LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Published as Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9775.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Judicial Checks and Balances (2004)
Working Paper: Judicial Checks and Balances (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9775

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9775

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().