Cooperation in Product Development and Process R&D Between Competitors
Marc Bourreau and
Pinar Dogan ()
Scholarly Articles from Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Abstract:
In this paper, we first provide a simple framework for cooperation in product development between competitors. We put forward the tradeoff between the benefits obtained through development cost sharing and the cost of intensified competition due to reduced product differentiation, which implies that no cooperation can be an equilibrium outcome. We allow for firms to cooperate partially, i.e., to develop some product components jointly, but not necessarily all components. This enables us to study the factors that may have an effect on the degree of cooperation in product development, both in the presence and in the absence of process R&D. We also analyze the interaction between cooperation decisions on product development and process R&D. By considering a direct link between the two, we show that the degree of cooperation in product development may adversely affect the intensity of cooperation in process R&D.
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization
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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4863170/Dogan-Cooperation_IJIO.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Cooperation in product development and process R&D between competitors (2010) 
Working Paper: Cooperation in product development and process R&D between competitors (2010)
Working Paper: Cooperation in Product Development and Process R&D Between Competitors (2007) 
Working Paper: Cooperation in Product Development and Process R&D Between Competitors 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:hksfac:4863170
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