Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment

Carsten Schmidt and Ro'i Zultan

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: It is commonly accepted that face-to-face communication induces cooperation. The experiment disentangles communication and social effect (replication of Roth, 1995) and examines the components of the social effect with the help of unilateral communication. Results suggest that separate processes, both of a strategic and of an affective-social nature may induce cooperative outcomes in ultimatum bargaining with pre-play communication, depending on the communication protocol. Unilateral communication is found to have weaker effects than bilateral communication, and affects especially the recipient of the communication.

Keywords: one way communication; pre-play communication; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2004-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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