Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it suffices to recall the last two periods of play.

JEL-codes: C7 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/abs/uncoupl-st.html (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2015)
Chapter: STOCHASTIC UNCOUPLED DYNAMICS AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM (2013)
Journal Article: Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium (2006)
Working Paper: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004)
Working Paper: Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp371

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Simkin ().