Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

Keywords: Uncoupled; Nash equilibrium; stochastic dynamics; bounded recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2015)
Chapter: STOCHASTIC UNCOUPLED DYNAMICS AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM (2013)
Journal Article: Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium (2006)
Working Paper: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004)
Working Paper: Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:783

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