Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in "Noisy" Social Exchange
Gary Bornstein and
Ori Weisel ()
Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem
Explaining human cooperation in large groups of non-kin is a major challenge to both rational choice theory and the theory of evolution. Recent research suggests that group cooperation can be explained assuming that cooperators can punish non-cooperators or cheaters. The experimental evidence comes from economic games in which group members are informed about the behavior of all others and cheating occurs in full view. We demonstrate that under more realistic information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is ineffective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the explanatory power of punishment is constrained by the visibility of cheating.
Pages: 11 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-soc and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Punishment, Cooperation, and Cheater Detection in “Noisy” Social Exchange (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:huj:dispap:dp528
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