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Social Identity and Social Free-Riding

Mark Bernard (), Florian Hett and Mario Mechtel
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Mark Bernard: Department of Management and Microeconomics, Goethe University Frankfurt

No 201505, IAAEU Discussion Papers from Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU)

Abstract: We model individual identification choice as a strategic group formation problem. When choosing a social group to identify with, individuals appreciate high social status and a group stereotype to which they have a small social distance. A group's social status and stereotype are shaped by the (exogenous) individual attributes of its members and hence endogenous to individuals' choices. Unless disutility from social distance is strong enough, this creates a strategic tension as individuals with attributes that contribute little to group status would like to join high-status groups, thereby diluting the latters' status and changing stereotypes. Such social free-riding motivates the use of soft exclusion technologies in high-status groups, which provides a unifying rationale for phenomena such as hazing rituals, charitable activities or status symbols that is not taste-based or follows a standard signaling mechanism.

Keywords: social identity; social status; social distance; categorization; group formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D03 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: Social identity and social free-riding (2016) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iaa:dpaper:201505

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