Political Market for Agricultural Protection, The

Lilyan Fulginiti

Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications from Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University

Abstract: Why do poor countries tax agriculture more than other sectors, whereas rich countries subsidize farmers? Using the neoclassical economic theory of the political market for Distortionary policies, an explanation is sought by examining changes to factors affecting the supply and demand curves in that political market. The aggregate effect of these changes is a shift in both the demand curves and the supply curve to the right as industrialization proceeds.

Date: 1992-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Market for Agricultural Protection, The (1992)
Working Paper: Political Market for Agricultural Protection (The) (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ias:cpaper:92-gatt5

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