Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information

JunJie Wu and Bruce Babcock

Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications from Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University

Abstract: Green payment programs, by which the government pays farmers directly for environmental benefits, have been proposed as an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits by restricting farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This paper examines a green payment program applied to irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma Panhandle, where nitrogen fertilizer is a conjoint source of pollution.

Date: 1995-02
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Related works:
Journal Article: OPTIMAL DESIGN OF A VOLUNTARY GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAM UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION (1995)
Working Paper: Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information (1995)
Working Paper: Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program under Asymmetric Information (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ias:cpaper:95-wp131

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