Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

Guilherme Carmona and José Fajardo ()

No 2006-05, IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers from Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro

Abstract: We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.

Keywords: Common Agency; Menu Games; Sequential Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D82 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection (2009)
Working Paper: Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection (2006)
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