Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection
Guilherme Carmona () and
José Fajardo ()
FEUNL Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia
We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be su±cient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.
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Journal Article: Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection (2009)
Working Paper: Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp490
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