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Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

Guilherme Carmona () and José Fajardo ()

FEUNL Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia

Abstract: We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be su±cient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection (2006) Downloads
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