Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection

Guilherme Carmona and José Fajardo ()

Nova SBE Working Paper Series from Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics

Abstract: We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be su cient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of equilibrium in common agency games with adverse selection (2009)
Working Paper: Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp490

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