Explaining de facto judicial independence
Bernd Hayo and
Stefan Voigt
ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research
Abstract:
De facto judicial Independence (JI) seems to be highly and robustly significant for economic growth. But JI as formally written down in legal texts is a imperfect predictor for de facto JI. This paper thus tries to identify the variables, which determine de facto JI.. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and that are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant because attempts to make judiciaries more independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors beyond the control of national governments and international organizations.
Keywords: Judicial independence; informal institutions; formal institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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http://www.bemservizi.unito.it/repec/icr/wp2004/Voigt1-04.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2007) 
Working Paper: Explaining de facto Judicial Independence (2005) 
Working Paper: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:01-2004
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