Explaining de facto judicial independence
Bernd Hayo () and
Stefan Voigt ()
Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Judicial Independence (JI) as factually implemented varies considerably between countries. Since de iure JI is an imperfect predictor of de facto JI, a number of variables that might determine the factual level of judicial independence is theoretically discussed and empirically tested. A distinction between factors that can be influenced in the short run and those that are the result of historical development and are exempt from short-term modification is made. Ascertaining the relative relevance of these two groups of variables promises to be policy-relevant because attempts to make judiciaries more independent within governance programs might be seriously constrained by factors beyond the control of national governments and international organizations.
Keywords: Judicial independence; informal institutions; formal institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 33; figures: included
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Journal Article: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2007)
Working Paper: Explaining de facto Judicial Independence (2005)
Working Paper: Explaining de facto judicial independence (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0306001
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