Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game
Andrea Gallice ()
ICER Working Papers from ICER - International Centre for Economic Research
We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which play- ers can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radi- cally change with the number of players involved in the game. In the course of the analysis we also introduce, discuss and apply the concept of pu-dominance, a generalization of the risk-dominance criterion to games with more than two players.
Keywords: stealing; endogenous timing games; pu-dominance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game (2012)
Working Paper: Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:icr:wpicer:02-2008
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