Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game
Andrea Gallice ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which players can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radically change with the number of players involved in the game. In the course of the analysis we also introduce, discuss and apply the concept of pu-dominance, a generalization of the risk-dominance criterion to games with more than two players.
Keywords: Stealing; endogenous timing games; pu-dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game (2012)
Working Paper: Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:10256
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