When Women Win: Can Female Representation Decrease Gender-Based Violence?

Veronica Frisancho, Evi Pappa and Chiara Santantonio

No 12469, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank

Abstract: Every day, three women are murdered in the United States by a current or former partner. Yet policy action to prevent gender-based violence has been limited. Previous studies have highlighted the effect of female political representation on crimes against women in the developing world. This paper investigates whether the election of a female politician reduces the incidence of gender-based violence in the United States. Using a regression discontinuity design on mixed-gender races, we find that the election of a female House Representative leads to a short-lived decline in the prevalence of femicides in her electoral district. The drop in femicides is mainly driven by a deterrence effect that results from higher police responsiveness and effort in solving gender-related crimes.

JEL-codes: D72 J12 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Working Paper: When Women Win: Can Female Representation Decrease Gender-Based Violence? (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:12469

DOI: 10.18235/0004513

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