When Women Win: Can Female Representation Decrease Gender-Based Violence?

Veronica Frisancho, Evi Pappa and Chiara Santantonio

No 17598, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Every day, three women are murdered in the United States by a current or former partner. Yet policy action to prevent gender-based violence has been limited. Previous studies have highlighted the effect of female political representation on crimes against women in the developing world. This paper investigates whether the election of a female politician reduces the incidence of gender-based violence in the United States. Using a regression discontinuity design on mixed-gender races, we find that the election of a female House Representative leads to a short-lived decline in the prevalence of femicides in her electoral district. The drop in femicides is mainly driven by a deterrence effect that results from higher police responsiveness and effort in solving gender-related crimes.

Keywords: Close elections; Regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 J12 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-10
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Working Paper: When Women Win: Can Female Representation Decrease Gender-Based Violence? (2022)
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