On the Micro-Foundations of Contract versus Conflict with Implications for International Peace-Making

Syed Mansoob Murshed and Jose Cuesta

No 1629, IDB Publications (Working Papers) from Inter-American Development Bank

Abstract: This paper expands the micro-foundations of the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative model of civil conflict between a government and a rebel group.First, the papers model allows for greed and grievance to be orthogonal, so that they may affect each other. Second, the model allows for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary. Third, the paper allows for Diaspora transfers to rebel groups.Fourth, the paper expands external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers buying peace. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and why sub-optimal sanctions provision (cheap talk) by the international community are frequent.

Keywords: WP-644 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D72 D74 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the micro-foundations of contract versus conflict with implications for international peace-making (2012)
Working Paper: On the Micro-Foundations of Contract versus Conflict with Implications for International Peace-Making (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:brikps:1629

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