On the Micro-Foundations of Contract versus Conflict with Implications for International Peace-Making

Jose Cuesta and Syed Mansoob Murshed

No 4591, Research Department Publications from Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department

Abstract: This paper expands the micro-foundations of the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative model of civil conflict between a government and a rebel group. First, the paper’s model allows for greed and grievance to be orthogonal, so that they may affect each other. Second, the model allows for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary. Third, the paper allows for Diaspora transfers to rebel groups. Fourth, the paper expands external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers “buying” peace. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and why sub-optimal sanctions provision (“cheap talk”) by the international community are frequent.

Date: 2008-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=W ... e_name=pubWP-644.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=WP-644&pub_file_name=pubWP-644.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=WP-644&pub_file_name=pubWP-644.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the micro-foundations of contract versus conflict with implications for international peace-making (2012)
Working Paper: On the Micro-Foundations of Contract versus Conflict with Implications for International Peace-Making (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:idb:wpaper:4591

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Department Publications from Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Felipe Herrera Library ().