Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns
Daniel Montolio and
Amedeo Piolatto
No 2011/30, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)
Abstract:
Human capital and, therefore, education have an impact on the society’s future welfare. In this paper we study the connection between the voters’ support to public education and the retirement concerns. We show that voters anticipate the positive effect of education on future pensions. The support for a publicly financed education system increases, the more redistributive the pension system is, and this is true also amongst citizens preferring a private school. We also show that the “ends against the middle” equilibrium can occur even when the voters’ preferred tax rate is decreasing in income.
Keywords: education; social security; voting; altruism; OLG (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H31 H42 H52 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://ieb.ub.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2011-IEB-WorkingPaper-30.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Related works:
Working Paper: Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns (2021) 
Working Paper: Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns (2011) 
Working Paper: Financing public education: a political economy model with altruistic agents and retirement concerns (2011) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2011-30
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().