Financing public education: a political economy model with altruistic agents and retirement concerns

Amedeo Piolatto

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: Public services provision depends on tax proceeds. The tax rate to finance public school is chosen through majority voting. Under the monotonicity condition implying that the preferred tax rate is decreasing in income, the literature predicts that the median voter is decisive and poor agents form a coalition against rich agents. I show that this does not occur and a coalition of the type "ends against the middle" occurs if agents care about others' level of education. I use a OLG model, in which adults are altruist and retirees’ pension depends on average education (used as a proxy for productivity).

Keywords: Education; Voting; Altruism; Retirement; OLG (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H31 H42 H52 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2011-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published by Ivie

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2011-12.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns (2011)
Working Paper: Financing public education when altruistic agents have retirement concerns (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2011-12

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