Popularity shocks and political selection
Francisco Cavalcanti () and
Sergio Galletta ()
No 2018/04, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)
We observe that popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voters’ behaviors. By focusing on Brazilian politics, we show that the disclosure of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local administrators affects the type of candidates who stand for election. When the audit finds low levels of corruption, the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption. These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media.
Keywords: Political selection; corruption; competence; local election; political parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Popularity shocks and political selection (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2018-04
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