The impact of ‘competition for the market’ regulatory designs on intercity bus prices

Anna Matas () and Javier Asensio

No 2021/06, Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB)

Abstract: Spain regulates its intercity bus market by means of a ’competition for the market’ mechanism, whose design has been modified several times in the last years. This implies that current services are operated under contracts whose conditions are heterogeneous. We take advantage of such fact to empirically measure the impact that regulatory designs may have on fares paid by the users. The results show very large differences between routes whose contracts were awarded under relatively open conditions compared to regionally regulated routes or very old contracts whose concessions were extended and have not been retendered.

Keywords: Intercity buses; prices; tendering; competition for the market. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 D47 L51 L92 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ieb.ub.edu/ca/publication/2021-06-the-impa ... ntercity-bus-prices/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2021-06

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().