Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games

Pierpaolo Battigalli ()

No 111, Working Papers from IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University

Abstract: We show how to extend the construction of infinite hierachies of beliefs (Mertens and Zamir (1985), Brandenburger and Dekel (1993)) from the case of probability measures to the case of conditional probability systems (CPSs) defined with respect to a fixed collection of relevant hypotheses. The set of hierarchies of CPSs satisfying common certainty of coherency conditional on every relevant hypothesis corresponds to a universal type space. This construction provides a unified framework to analyze the epistemic foundations of solution concepts for dynamic games. As an illustration, we derive some results about conditional common certainty of rationality and rationalizability in multistage games with observed actions.

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Journal Article: Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games (1999)
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