Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments

Giorgio Coricelli (), Dietmar Fehr and Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling ()

No 151, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.

Keywords: Public goods; Partner selection; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

Downloads: (external link)
https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/1550 First version, 2004 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2004)
Working Paper: Partner selection in public goods experiments (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:151

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Institute for Advanced Studies - Library, Josefstädterstr. 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies Josefstädterstr. 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Doris Szoncsitz ().