Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments
Giorgio Coricelli (),
Dietmar Fehr and
Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling ()
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, vol. 48, issue 3, 356-378
The effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good is examined. Participants are in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence, they can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection mechanisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher cooperation in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average monetary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.
Keywords: public goods; partner selection; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (2004)
Working Paper: Partner selection in public goods experiments (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:3:p:356-378
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