Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members

Vera Angelova, Werner Güth and Martin Kocher
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Werner Güth: Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany

No 10, IHS Working Paper Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.

Keywords: Cooperation; leadership; social dilemma; public goods provision; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/5209/ First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members (2019)
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