Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members
Vera Angelova (),
Werner Güth and
Martin Kocher ()
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Werner Güth: Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany
No 10, IHS Working Paper Series from Institute for Advanced Studies
We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership.
Keywords: Cooperation; leadership; social dilemma; public goods provision; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-soc
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http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/ihswps-10.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Leadership in a Public Goods Experiment with Permanent and Temporary Members (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ihs:ihswps:10
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