Technology protectionism and the patent system: Evidence from China

Gaétan de Rassenfosse and Emilio Raiteri

Working Papers from Chair of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy

Abstract: Governments have strong incentives to allow their inventors to free ride on foreign technologies. They can achieve this result by discriminating against foreigners in the patent system--by refusing to grant foreigners a patent for their inventions. International patent law treaties forbid this practice, which may lower the global innovation incentives and may hurt international trade. Using data on half a million inventions submitted to the Chinese patent office, we find robust evidence of anti-foreign bias in the issuance of patents in 'strategic' technology areas. Foreigners are about 50 percent more likely to be refused a strategic patent than locals.

Keywords: industrial policy; national treatment principle; patent; technology protectionism; TRIPS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F52 K11 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-ino, nep-int, nep-ipr and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Technology Protectionism and the Patent System: Evidence from China (2022)
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