Do Patents Enable Disclosure? Evidence from the Invention Secrecy Act

Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Gabriele Pellegrino and Emilio Raiteri

Working Papers from Chair of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy

Abstract: This paper provides empirical evidence suggesting that patents may facilitate knowledge disclosure. The analysis exploits the Invention Secrecy Act, which grants the U.S. Commissioner for Patents the right to prevent the disclosure of new inventions that represent a threat to national security. Using a two-level matching approach, we document a negative and large relationship between the enforcement of a secrecy order and follow-on inventions, as captured with patent citations and text-based measures of invention similarity. The effect carries over to after the lift of the secrecy period, suggesting a lost generation of inventions. The results bear implications for innovation and intellectual property policy.

Keywords: disclosure; follow-on invention; knowledge diffusion; patent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2023-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-sbm and nep-tid
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https://cdm-repec.epfl.ch/iip-wpaper/WP26.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do patents enable disclosure? Evidence from the invention secrecy act (2024)
Working Paper: Do Patents Enable Disclosure? Evidence from the Invention Secrecy Act (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iip:wpaper:26

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