Policy Inconsistency and External Debt Service

International Monetary Fund

No 1990/035, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: In this paper it is argued that the willingness of debtors to make external debt-service payments reflects, in part, their inability to credibly and permanently suspend debt service. The benefits of a credible debt-service suspension would include increased private investment. But this would, in turn, tend to create conditions in which it would then be optimal for the government to resume payments. Thus, debt remains a threat even after the announcement of suspension of debt service. It follows that the expected benefits of such a suspension are limited and may be offset by penalties imposed by creditors.

Keywords: WP; investment; tax rate; investment equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 1990-01-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=27626 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1990/035

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().