Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraintson National Budgetary Policies

International Monetary Fund

No 1990/060, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper reviews the pros and cons of institutionalized constraints limiting the freedom of national budgetary policies within an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. The issue is approached from three angles: the influence of EMU on (i) budget discipline; (ii) intergenerational equity and intertemporal efficiency; and (iii) macroeconomic stabilization. The desirability of constraints on budgetary policy is related to the arrangements for EMU-wide monetary policy, the credibility of a no-bailout clause among member states, and progress in the area of supply-side policies.

Keywords: WP; government; monetary union; country; EC country; EMU government; government issuance; exchange rate; EC government; government expenditure; Budget planning and preparation; Monetary unions; Price stabilization; Government debt management; Europe; North America; Northern Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 1990-01-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1990/060

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