Independent Currency Authorities; An Analytic Primer
Kent Osband and
Delano Villanueva ()
No 1992/050, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund
This paper provides an analytic overview of independent currency authorities (ICAs), sometimes called currency boards. ICAs issue and redeem domestic currency against an exchange standard on demand and back such operations through a 100 percent marginal foreign reserve cover. They also impose significant constraints on the banking system and the budget of the country that operates them. When supporting institutions have been put in place, ICAs appear to have promoted price stability, foreign trade, saving, and investment.
Keywords: Crawling peg; Currencies; Banking systems; Inflation; central bank, currency board, reserve currency, domestic currency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Independent Currency Authorities: An Analytic Primer (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1992/050
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jim Beardow ().