International Environmental Taxation in the Absence of Sovereignty

Bernard Herber

No 1992/104, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Traditional public finance theory may be applied to the internalization of international environmental externalities. The policy constraint imposed by the absence of sovereign international government may be partially overcome through international environmental agreements. Instruments such as cost sharing, found in existing agreements, are generally unsophisticated. Two proposals entailing improved instruments are considered: (a) an international carbon tax, and (b) a global commons trust fund financed by earmarked excise taxes or charges. Political realities appear to preclude the early adoption of sophisticated international environmental taxes, but modest improvements in the design and implementation of existing instruments may be feasible.

Keywords: WP; excise tax; developing nation; administration system; home-nation retention; nation B; tax administration; nations signatory; net benefit; access price; demand and supply; global warming; tax academic; Environmental taxes; Carbon tax; Extra-budgetary funds; Excises; Greenhouse gas emissions; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 1992-12-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=855 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1992/104

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().