A Primeron Tax Evasion

Vito Tanzi and Parthasarathi Shome

No 1993/021, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Tax evasion is universal. It depends on the economic and tax structures, types of income, and social attitudes. The theory of tax evasion has limitations since it depends solely on the attitude toward risk with full information regarding the tax administration’s behavior. Methodologies for estimating tax evasion include predominantly estimating the underground economy, and comparing taxes declared with potential tax revenue calculated from national accounts. Actions in addressing tax evasion include use of withholding, presumptive and minimum taxes, selective auditing, penalties, and cross checks between taxes.

Keywords: WP; tax; administration; vis-à-vis tax evasion; a lot of tax evasion; tax-evading motivation; tax administration resource; tax administrator; tax department; single tax; tax authority; tax obligation; tax evasion of professional; Tax evasion; Tax administration core functions; Compliance costs; Income tax systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 1993-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1993/021

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