Varieties of Monetary Reforms

Pierre Siklos

No 1994/057, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper surveys three types of monetary arrangements. It considers how the choice of an exchange rate regime, the degree of central bank independence, or choice of currency unions or boards depends not only on economic considerations but also on political economy considerations. In economic terms, the choice of monetary regime will depend on the policy that is best suited to reducing or stabilizing inflation. In political economy terms, the choice of monetary arrangement will ultimately depend on how independent a country wishes to be from shocks emanating from the rest of the world and the weight politicians attach to influencing economic conditions in their own country.

Keywords: WP; central bank; inflation; index style ranking; reaction function; central bank authorities; adjustable peg; EMU convergence criteria; inflation rate; central bank reaction function; growth objective; Exchange rate arrangements; Conventional peg; Central bank autonomy; Monetary unions; Exchange rate flexibility; South America; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 1994-05-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Working Paper: Varieties of Monetary Reforms (1993)
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