Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process

Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti ()

No 1996/060, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper examines the rationale for the imposition of fiscal rules as a way to reduce budgetary imbalances. It presents theoretical arguments for the existence of a “fiscal deficit bias” and the empirical evidence on the economic, political and institutional factors leading to this bias. In the context of these findings, it discusses the potential role of legal constraints on the level of key fiscal variables, and of reforms in budgetary procedures in enhancing fiscal discipline. It also evaluates proposals for budgetary reform in Italy.

Keywords: WP; budget proposal; government resignation; finance minister; government fiscal policy decision; government policy formation; government vis-à-vis parliament; government stage; Budget planning and preparation; Government debt management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 1996-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=2048 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process (1997)
Working Paper: Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1996/060

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/pubs/ord_info.htm

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().