Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?

International Monetary Fund

No 1997/073, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper develops and tests two efficiency wage models of corruption in the civil service. Under fair wage models, civil service wages are an important determinant of corruption. Under shirking models, the level of wages is of secondary importance, as potential bribes dwarf wage income. The empirical evidence points to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries. Tests as to the validity of the two different efficiency wage models are inconclusive.

Keywords: WP; private sector; civil servant; civil service wage; wage policy; wg relative; wage hypothesis; wage variable; wage data; capitulation wage; wage-corruption hypothesis; pay reform; relative wage; black market; market clearing wage; private sector wage; manufacturing wage; Corruption; Wages; Civil service; Public sector wages; Income; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 56
Date: 1997-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (111)

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