Controlling Fiscal Corruption

Sheetal Chand and Karl Ove Moene

No 1997/100, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper examines the issue of controlling fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. First, a case study of a successful attack on corruption is presented that shows the importance of attending to the conditions of service of fiscal officers. Second, a model is developed drawing on the conclusions of the case study that shows their consistency with optimization behavior. It confirms that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a virtuous circle.

Keywords: WP; tax collector; tax income; Fiscal performance; corruption; incentives; tax evasion; Ghana; tax authority; constituted revenue authority; tax collectors choice; clearance certificate; tax officer; revenue improvement; tax collectors increase; tax ratio; Bonuses; Tax administration core functions; Civil service (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 1997-08-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Journal Article: Controlling Fiscal Corruption (1999)
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