Economics at your fingertips  

Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly

Ling Hui Tan ()

No 2000/065, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licenses to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest.

Keywords: Trade liberalization; Imports; Asset prices; Import licensing; Trade barriers; WP,free trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2000-03-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Akshay Modi ().

Page updated 2021-03-02
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2000/065