Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly

Ling Hui Tan

No 2000/065, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licenses to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest.

Keywords: WP; free trade; Auction quota; duopoly; license price; quota license; importing country; quota level; response function; Trade liberalization; Imports; Asset prices; Import licensing; Australia and New Zealand; Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2000-03-01
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