Global Financial Crises: Institutions and Incentives

Manmohan Kumar, Paul Masson and Marcus Miller

No 2000/105, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Increasing emphasis has been placed on the need for an effective lender of last resort for sovereign states and on procedures for sovereign debt restructuring to help cope with global financial crises. Where private creditors use short-term debt to check sovereign debtor’s moral hazard, there is the risk of self-fulfilling crises. In this context, we conclude that the proposal of the Meltzer Commission—for unconditional financial support, but only to states that pre-qualify—could be the source of increased instability. After discussing analogies with private sector arrangements, we compare the operations of the existing Paris Club with proposed Chapter 11 style procedures.

Keywords: WP; short term; private sector; long-term debt; debtor country; emerging market; International monetary reform; lender of last resort; financial crises; short term debt; one-off debt reduction; valuation model; debt maturity; values jump; debt rollover; Liquidity; Moral hazard; Sovereign debt restructuring; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2000-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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