Costly Collateral and the Public Supply of Liquidity

Philip Schellekens

No 2000/125, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper addresses two complications arising from the use of collateral requirements in debt contracts between wealth-constrained entrepreneurs and banks. First, costly asset liquidation is found to enhance the susceptibility of debt finance to interest rate volatility. Second, aggregate uncertainty in conjunction with limited bank capitalization is shown to produce excessive credit constraints that, under certain conditions, justify the public supply of liquidity. The paper suggests applications with respect to models of interest rate smoothing and self-fulfilling currency crises.

Keywords: WP; optimal contract; interest rate; external finance; Debt Finance; Collateral; Credit Constraints; Asset Price Volatility; asset collateralization; solvency constraint; bank solvency consideration; asset liquidation; net loan rate; representative bank; contingent contract; bank solvency constraint; bank profit variability; asset price uncertainty; rate repayment; Self-employment; Asset prices; Credit; Loans (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2000-07-01
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