Sanctions and Civil Conflict

Dmitry Gershenson

No 2001/066, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant who is subject to sanctions can expect to derive a positive income in case of compliance. The likelihood of success rises as this income increases.

Keywords: WP; defeat income; victory income; challenger group; Sanctions; Conflict; Surrender; apartheid government; Castro regime; challenger's victory; Personal income; Consumption; Defense spending; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2001-05-01
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