Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?

George Kopits

No 2001/145, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: With the primary objective of conferring credibility on macroeconomic policies, an increasing number of advanced and emerging market economies have adopted various forms of fiscal rules (mainly balanced-budget requirements and debt limits). In contrast to previous fiscal rules, many of which lacked transparency, recently introduced rules have the potential of serving as a useful depoliticized policy framework, and over time, can contribute to stability and growth. To this end, they need to be well designed and supported by an appropriate institutional infrastructure.

Keywords: WP; government; country; below-cost pricing; default risk premium; General government; fiscal policy; government assets; surveillance authority; authorities discretion; arbitration authority; Fiscal rules; Budget planning and preparation; Inflation targeting; Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2001-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (124)

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