Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions

Francesca Castellani and Xavier Debrun

No 2001/205, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We study the desirability of reforming fiscal institutions along with the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central

Keywords: WP; monetary policy; inflation rate; CB governor; CB independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2001-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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