Government Spending, Legislature Size, and the Executive Veto

Reza Baqir

No 2001/208, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Recent work on the political economy of fiscal policy has asked how budgetary institutions affect fiscal outcomes. But what determines the budgetary institutions? In this paper I consider one such institution: the executive veto. A simple theoretical framework predicts that jurisdictions with more political actors spending from a common pool of tax resources will choose to empower their executives. Using an econometric framework to identify the exogenous variation in the number of districts, I present evidence from a cross-section of local governments in the United States that jurisdictions with more electoral districts are likely to have executives with veto powers.

Keywords: WP; government spending; city manager; political institutions; executive veto; council size; veto authority; mayor-council city; state indicator; city government; Personal income; Budget planning and preparation; Probit models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2001-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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