Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms

Roel Beetsma and Xavier Debrun

No 2003/174, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper analyzes the decision of a government facing electoral uncertainty to implement structural reforms in the presence of fiscal restraints similar to the Stability and Growth Pact. The model shows that a pact may harm structural reforms, sacrificing future growth for present stability. The welfare gains brought about by a pact depend on a trade-off between the reduction in the deficit bias and the induced reduction in the amount of structural reform. A pact becomes more attractive (“smarter”) if it takes into account the fiscal impact of structural reforms, in line with a recent proposal by the European Commission.

Keywords: WP; public goods; Structural reforms; Stability and Growth Pact; Monetary Union; Sanctions; partisan government; budget constraint; deficit bias; incumbent government; Budget planning and preparation; Employment protection; Structural policies; Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2003-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Journal Article: Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms (2004)
Working Paper: Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms (2003)
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