Do IMF-Supported Programs Boost Private Capital Inflows? the Role of Program Size and Policy Adjustment

Roberto Benelli

No 2003/231, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: I analyze empirically whether program size (the size of financial assistance) and policy adjustment matter for the success of IMF-supported programs. I define a program as successful if the initial program projections for net private capital flows are met or exceeded. I find that success is negatively associated with the size of financial assistance, especially in countries with market access, and that projection biases binding constraints on the amount of IMF lending may account for this association. Moreover, policy adjustment seems to have a causal positive effect on the likelihood of program success.

Keywords: WP; capital flow; program access; IMF program; IMF staff; program size.; Success of IMF programs; policy adjustment under programs; program size; inflation change; IMF capital; IMF incentive; IMF confidence; market access; IMF arrangement; Private capital flows; Capital flows; Inflation; Capital inflows; Fiscal consolidation; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2003-11-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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