The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice

Michael Taylor, Marc Quintyn and Eva Hüpkes

No 2005/051, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Policymakers' uneasiness about granting independence to financial sector regulators stems to a large extent from the lack of familiarity with, and elusiveness of, the concept of accountability. This paper gives operational content to accountability and argues that it is possible to do so in a way that encourages and supports agency independence. The paper first elaborates on the role and purposes of accountability. Second, it shows that the unique features of financial sector supervision point to a more complex system of accountability arrangements than, for instance, the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, the paper discusses specific arrangements that can best secure the objectives of accountability and, thus, independence. Our findings have a wider application than financial sector supervision.

Keywords: WP; agency independence; enforcement power; judicial review; chief executive; minister of finance; regulatory agency; RSAS concrete (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2005-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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