Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention

Jonathan Ostry and Jeromin Zettelmeyer

No 2005/206, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: To better fulfill its crisis-prevention mandate, IMF surveillance needs to provide stronger incentives for countries to follow good policies and for markets to avoid boom-bust cycles in capital flows. To this end, surveillance should culminate in a summary public assessment of the quality of a country's policies and stipulate the actions needed to address shortcomings. A country's potential access to IMF credits should be linked to the quality of its policies in noncrisis periods in order to create stronger incentives for better policies and reduce incentives for capital to flow where it cannot be used in socially beneficial ways.

Keywords: WP; fund; country; policy; lending; IMF crisis lending; International Monetary Fund; Crisis prevention; IMF surveillance; fund crisis-prevention policy recommendation; country policy; IMF disbursement; IMF crisis prevention; IMF decision; IMF package; Capital markets; Emerging and frontier financial markets; Exchange rates; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2005-11-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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